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A special interest in ﬁnancial intermediation arose in 80-90’s years of the last century due
to a sequence of ﬁnancial distortions and crises. Financial intermediation is called one of the
possible reasons for these disturbances. Sachs (1998) analyses the sources of ﬁnancial crises and
distinguishes between four triggering mechanisms of ﬁnancial, exchange and banking crises: ex-
ogenous shock, policy shock, exhaustion of borrowing limits and a self-fulﬁlling panics. Since
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the self-fulﬁlling banking panic is perhaps the most often studied
phenomenon among the triggering mechanisms. The current paper focuses on shock-triggered
banking crises and their relation to the exhaustion of borrowing resources.
In their comprehensive review of the theory of ﬁnancial intermediation, Gorton and Winton
(2003) stress the distinction between banking panics and crises, triggered by a common shock,
which "brings the soundness of the banking system into question". Still, as they note, "most of
the vast literature on bank regulation is within the paradigm of panics, deposit insurance, and
moral hazard." However, empirical ﬁndings show that a theoretically optimal regulation does not
necessarily prevent crises. For example, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) question whether
deposit insurance increases banking system stability; Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) raise the
same question with respect to tight regulation and direct government supervision.
Policy implications depend crucially on the role banks play in a macroeconomic environ-
ment. During the last two decades, the literature usually justiﬁed the existence of ﬁnancial in-
termediation through its role in the reduction of transaction costs (Benston and Smith, 1975), in
liquidity provision (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and in information provision (Diamond, 1984).
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) show that debt renegotiation can make ﬁnancial intermediation
superior to ﬁnancial markets. These functions of the intermediation determine the structure of
models focusing at macroeconomic effects of the intermediation. So, Bernanke and Gertler (1987)
embed the banking sector into a stylized general equilibrium framework to show that banks matter
to real activity mainly because they provide the only available conduit between savers and in-
vestment projects, which require intensive evaluation and auditing. Bencivenga and Smith (1991)
2suggest a Diamond-Dybvig (1983) based theoretical framework for studying various ﬁnancial reg-
ulations of the ﬁnancial system in the context of macroeconomic growth.
Distinct fromthese studies, Allen and Gale (1997) presenta macroeconomic model, inwhich
banks perform intertemporal risk smoothing and thus provide a macroeconomy with a Pareto-
optimal allocation, whereas the latter cannot be achieved through a market-based ﬁnancial system
because of the incomplete participation constraint. Allen and Gale (1997) stress that in order
to provide intertemporal smoothing, an intermediary needs some degree of market power, which
"may be the result of government intervention. For example, the government may give the in-
termediary an exclusive license in order to achieve an ex ante Pareto improvement." In a similar
macroeconomic framework with stochastic shocks, Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2006) show that
the competitive banking system may collapse in a ﬁnite number of periods.
The current paper contributes to the study of the intertemporal smoothing role of banks. In-
termediaries are embedded into an overlapping generations economy, which creates an incomplete
participation problem. The latter is seen as a metaphor for other sources of market incompleteness,
as in Allen and Gale (1997). The stochastic component of the model is transferred from dividends
directly to the production technology, as in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2006). The economy is
extended to include the labor market in addition to capital and goods markets. The shock is shown
to have multiple transmission channels, and even if a market channel does not destroy the stability
of the system, it is the balance sheet channel in the intermediated system, which may magnify the
impact of the shock and lead to a collapse.
The major difference of the current paper from the both above is the reduction of the stochas-
tic component to a single temporary negative production shock. This is a special case of a shock
distribution function, which allows one to study subsequent events generated by the shock. This is-
sue is out of the focus of both Allen and Gale (1997) and Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2006). The
degenerated shock distribution may be seen as a metaphor for a long enough sequence of negative
shocks in a stochastic process with zero mean.
Finally, the current paper focuses on the study of a set of policy measures needed for the
intertemporal smoothing to sustain. In this sense, the current paper contributes to the literature on
3optimal anti-crisis regulation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the general macroeconomic environment
and discusses the nature of the shock. Sections 3 and 4 study the market-based economy and the
intermediatedeconomyrespectively. Section5discussespossibleregulatoryinterventions. Section
6 provides a discussion of welfare issues. The paper concludes with the summary of results.
2 Macroeconomic Environment
The description will follow, as close as possible, the notation of Diamond (1965), whose
model is a good departure for the analysis. One thing should be noticed in advance: in the current
paper, productive ﬁrms are not assumed to exist inﬁnitely long. Still, the problem of intergenera-
tional lending does not arise: any debtor-creditor relationships only appear between the members
ofonegeneration. This isanimportantissue, sinceitunderlinesthatalthoughbanks are long-living
institutions, they are not critical for the existence and functionning of the economy.
2.1 Agents, Preferences and Technologies
The economy consists of overlapping generations. Each generation is distributed over the interval
[0,1] and divided into two groups: workers and entrepreneurs with η -t h es h a r eo fw o r k e r si ne a c h
generation. All agents live for two periods and are endowed with one unit of labor in the beginning
of their lives. Entrepreneurs are distinct from workers in that they have access to a production
technology in the second period of their lives. The whole young generation works, consumes and
saves. The old generation consumes (if workers) or produces and consumes (if entrepreneurs).
All agents of each generation t ≥ 1 have identical intertemporal utility functions ut (c0,c 1)
with c0 =consumption of anagent of generationtwhen young, and c1 =his consumption when old.
The time index denotes the beginning of the period: generation t is born at moment t when period t
begins, is young till moment t+1, is old in period t+1and dies in moment t+2, which ends period















4Utility functions are identical among generations. The utility level of an agent born in period







The production technology produces a consumption/capital good. The technology is identi-
cal among entrepreneurs and among periods and is given by f (k,l),w h e r ek = physical capital
and l = the amount of labor used for production. The production function is continuous, twice














All generations are identical, except the old generation of period t =1 ,w h i c hl i v e so n l y
for one period and is initially endowed with some amount of savings used for production. This
generation will be neglected in the analysis.
2.2 Shock
The economy may suffer from a production shock. Often, economics deals with technology
shocks, which are events that change a production function in macroeconomic models. Tech-
nology shocks are permanent and mostly consider e dt ob ep o s i t i v e( s e ee .g. Galí, 2004, for some
discussion). In contrast to technology shocks, production (or productivity) shocks can be nega-
tive. Another common type of shock in economics is a supply shock, which can be a consequence
of a technology shock (and then the supply shock is mostly positive) or not (most negative sup-
ply shocks are not technology-driven and are not necessarily productivity-driven). In a dynamic
framework, the literature distinguishes between permanent and non-permanent shocks (see e.g.
Hall, 1988). It is also necessary to distinguish between the shock impact (instantaneous effects of
the shock) and the subsequent effects (some discussion can be found in de Jong and Penzer, 1998).
The shock in the current paper is taken to be a sharp unexpected temporary change in production.
Assume that an entrepreneur of generation t employs kt+1 units of capital and lt+1 units of
labor. The production technology should produce f (kt+1,l t+1) units of consumption/capital good.





T h ea n a l y s i sh e r ef o c u s e so nan e g a t i v es h o c k ,t h e r e f o r eqt+1 ∈ [0,1]. Furthermore, the
5shock is assumed to be unpredictable and temporary. If the shock has its impact in period τ +1 ,
the distribution of the shock parameter in time can be written as
qt+1 =
½
1 if t 6= τ
q∗ < 1 if t = τ (2)
The shock may equally happen in any period, therefore the probability of the shock is given
by Pr(qt+1 = q∗)= 1
T →
T→∞
0. The latter is inﬁnitesimal since the number T of periods in the
model is inﬁnitely large.
2.3 Decision-making and Priority of Payments
Consider a typical generation t ≥ 1. Each member of this generation may be employed by some
old entrepreneur, who offers the wage rate of wt. Since the production facilities of this entrepre-
neurs are affected by shock qt, actual wage payment per unit of labor b wt may differ from wt.T h e
value of b wt is determined below.
Potential entrepreneurs of generation t solve, when young, their intertemporal utility maxi-
mization problem, which determines their consumption c0
t and savings sE
t in period t,a sw e l la s
their consumption c1









t ∈ [0,1] is the part of the unit labor endowment of an agent, which he wishes to be
employed. Since unemployed labor delivers no utility to the agent, but the employed labor strictly
increases his consumption, it is optimal for him to supply lE
t =1units of labor.
1
The second-period budget constraint of the entrepreneur restricts his second-period con-
sumption to the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm. The entrepreneur uses his savings sE
t of the ﬁrst period of







2 When old, the entrepreneur employs lt+1 units of labor for production in period
t +1 . Given the price system with the price of goods normalized to unity, the real wage rate in
period t +1equal to wt+1, and the real gross interest rate rt+1, which applies to credit granted to
entrepreneurs in period t and repaid in period t +1 , the entrepreneur pays wt+1lt+1 for the labor,
1 If b wt =0 , the agent is indifferent with regards of how much labor lE
t ∈ [0,1] he supplies.
2 In general, the difference kt+1 − sE
t might be negative. In an equilibrium (see section 3), this is






for the capital employed in the production. It will be assumed that entrepre-
neurs have perfect foresight regarding the future wage rate wt+1. The entrepreneur enjoys limited
liability, and his expected proﬁti s
Et+1 =m a x
£









Forthecasehisrevenue isnot high enoughto covertheexpenditures, thereexists apriorityof
payments: workers have the highest priority, the credito r sh a v el o w e rp r i o r i t y ,a n dt h ee n t r e p r e n e u r
himself has the lowest priority. Agents with higher priority are repaid before the agents with lower
priority. Therefore, the total wage expenditures of the entrepreneur are either wage payoffs at the
rate wt+1 per unit of labor, or the entire production if it does not exceed the total wage payoff due:
et+1 =m i n[ wt+1lt+1,q t+1f (kt+1,l t+1)] (4)
The rest is used to repay on credit:








,q t+1f (kt+1,l t+1) − et+1
¤
(5)
Equation (4) identiﬁes the actual wage payment per unit of labor b wt+1:







To proceed with the description of the optimization problem of an entrepreneur of generation
t, one can formulate his second period budget constraint as
c
1
t+1 =m a x
£








Summarizing and substututing for lE
t =1 , one obtains the expected utility maximization
problem of entrepreneurs





















t+1 =m a x
£








Separately from the utility maximization (due to Fisher’s separation theorem), entrepreneurs
3 Entrepreneurs might choose whether they invest their savings sE
t into their ﬁrms or act as creditors
in the credit market. If the entrepreneurs opt not to produce, their optimization problem is identical
to that of the workers. However, this case is irrelevant for the analysis. The equilibrium outcome would
guarantee that the credit interest rate is below the expected proﬁtability of the ﬁrms. Otherwise, all
entrepreneurs avoid running ﬁrms and the demand for credit is zero whilst the credit supply is positive.
7solve the expected proﬁt maximization problem of the ﬁrm. Since the shock is effectively unantic-
ipated, the problem reduces to
max
kt+1,lt+1







The properties of the production function guarantee that there are no corner solutions to the
problem. The internal solution produces the demand functions for capital k(rt+1,w t+1) and for
labor l(rt+1,w t+1). The solution of the expected utility maximization problem determines the
savings function of entrepreneurs sE
t = sE (b wt,w t+1,r t+1). As in Diamond (1965), 0 < ∂sE
∂ e wt < 1
(one cannot save more than one unit from a one unit increase in endowment); additionally, it can
be shown that ∂sE
∂wt+1 < 0 and ∂sE
∂rt+1 > 0.
Workers of generation t solve, when young, the intertemporal utility maximization problem
similar to that of entrepreneurs. This determines their consumption c0
t and savings sW
t in period t,
as well as the consumption c1
t+1 in period t +1 .





t = b wtl
W
t
As in the case of entrepreneurs, lW
t =1in the worker’s individual optimum.
Workers use their savings sW
t to credit young entrepreneurs at the rate rt+1.I f a f t e r t h e
realization of shock qt+1 in period t+1the actual credit payoff to an individual worker is less than
rt+1sW
t , the worker (creditor) experiences a deﬁcit.









The second-period budget constraint of the worker restricts the second-period consumption









t+1 is conditioned on qt+1, consumption in the second period is uncertain. Substi-
tuting for lW
t =1and summarizing, one can write the expected utility maximization problem of




























This problem determines the savings function of workers sW
t = sW (b wt,r t+1). As in the case of
entrepreneurs, 0 < ∂sW
∂ e wt < 1 and ∂sW
∂rt+1 > 0;
2.4 Degrees of Shock
Onecandeterminetwocriticalvaluesoftheshockparameter. First, q suchthatvaluesofqt+1 above














Given the priority of payments, and the two critical values above, one can distinguish be-
tween four degrees of shock:
1. Small shock: q∗ ∈ [q,1]. Both employees and creditors are repaid in full.




. Entrepreneurs are bankrupts, employees are repayed in full,
and creditors obtain the residual. Payoff to workers from each entrepreneur is et+1 = wt+1lt+1,
debt repayment is bt+1 = q∗f (kt+1t,l t+1) − wt+1lt+1.




. Entrepreneurs are bankrupt, the value of production does not sufﬁce
to repay workers in full. Debt repayments are zero, bt+1 =0 , the wage payment is et+1 =
q∗f (kt+1,l t+1)
4. Extreme shock q∗ =0corresponds to a complete destruction of production facilities. Entrepre-
neurs have zero revenue, wage payment and credit repayment is zero.
4 Formally, there are two stochastic components in the budget constraints: ﬁrst, it is b wt, which is determined by the
realizationoftheshockinperiodt, andsecond, itisdW
t+1, determinedbytherealizationoftheshockinperiodt+1.T h e
model describes the world with (almost) safe production technology and no alternative assets. It could be
extended for the case with a safe asset. Particularly, this would imply strictly positive real interest rates in equilibrium.
9Note that the degrees of the shock are relative to economic conditions, which determine q
and q. Appendix A provides a further discussion of the degrees of the shock.
3 Market Equilibrium
The following summarizes the life cycle of a typical generation t>1. All agents of this
generation exchange their unit labor endowment for b wt units of goods. Out of this amount, workers
and entrepreneurs create their savings sW
t and sE
t respectively. In the end of period t, entrepreneurs
of generation t need to acquire an additional capital stock It = kt+1 − sE
t to run ﬁrms. Investment
in the production technology takes place in the end of period t.
5 There exists a credit market, in
which workers can trade their savings against promissory notes of entrepreneurs. Credit market
clears in period t with the interest rate rt+1.
There also exists a labor market in each period t. Entrepreneurs of generation t employ
members of generation t+1f o rp r o d u c t i o ni np e r i o dt+1a tt h ew a g er a t ewt+1. Since the supply
of labor is ﬁxed at unity, the equilibrium wage rate only depends on the labor demand. Therefore,
the labor market of period t +1clears at the wage rate wt+1, which is known already in period t.
Period t +1starts and the shock parameter qt+1 is realized. Each entrepreneur’s wage ex-
penditures are et+1, and each member of generation t +1obtains b wt+1 per unit of labor. Capital
payoffs from entrepreneurs of generation t to workers of the same generation take place within




η bt+1 − rt+1sW
t .
The analysis focuses on tempora r ye q u i l i b r i ai ne a c hp e r i o dt conditioned on the realization
of the shock parameter qt (Markov equilibria). Each period’s t temporary equilibrium is parame-
trized on b wt inherited from the previous period according to (6). In the very ﬁrst period b wt is given
by the initial condition w1.
Deﬁnition 2 A (Markov) equilibrium in the shock-exposed market economy in period t ≥ 1 un-













, which for a given qt provides that the credit and labor markets clear:
5 It can also be viewed as though entrepreneurs of generation t create their production facilities along
the period t, investing in amount of kt+1 so that the investment process ends at the end of period t.







2. (1 − η)lt+1 =1
Knowing the equilibrium of period t, and the realization of the shock qt+1, one can determine
relized deﬁcit in period t +1 : dW
t+1 =
1−η
η bt+1 − rt+1sW
t .
Note that the equilibrium of period t is not conditioned on the level of deﬁcits dW
t .T h i si s
the distinctive property of the market economy. The level of deﬁcits dW
t is only relevant for the
level of consumption of old workers in period t, but not for the future equilibria.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium exists and is unique for any period t ≥ 1 if b wt > 0.
The proof of the proposition is based on Arrow and Debreu (1954), see Appendix B. Note
that an extreme shock (qt =0 )i m p l i e sb wt =0and hence violates the existence of the equilibrium.
The equilibrium may be represented in terms of two lines in the (wt+1,r t+1)-plane: LM depicting
equilibria in the labor market and CM depicting equilibria in the credit market (see Fig. 1). Since
the slope of the CM-line can be either negative or positive (but never smaller than the slope of the
LM-line, see Lemma 3 in Appendix B), both cases are presented in the diagram. Since both cases












































Figure 1. Market Equilibrium
Now consider the economy without shocks with an initial condition w1 > 0. Assume there
11exists such path of equilibrium price systems {wt+1,r t+1}
∞
t=0 that wt+1 = wt at least for all t ≥ τ.
In the absence of shocks (qt+1 =1 )w eo b t a i nb wt+1 = wt+1. If the wage level stays unchanged,
so does the actual wage payment b wt+1, and the interest rate level rt+1. The existence of a single
stable steady state is an assumption in Diamond (1965). The objective of the current paper is to
track out the difference between the market and the intermediated economy. It is easier done, if the
shockless market economy possesses a single stable steady state. This assumption may be relaxed,
in which case however it would not be obvious, what drives the instability of the steady state in
the intermediated economy below. The instability might in that case be either a speciﬁc property
of the intermediated economy or the heritage from the basic market economy model. To exclude
the latter, it is convenient to deal with a market economy which possesses a single stable stationary
equilibrium.
Consider now the market economy in its stationary equilibrium in some period τ and assume
it is heated by the shock in period τ +1 : qτ+1 = q∗ < 1.
If the shock is small, q∗ ∈ [q,1], entrepreneurs are able to fully pay both wages and debts in
periodτ+1. Next period starts with the same equilibrium as before the shock. The only population
that suffers from the shock, are entrepreneurs of generation τ.




, entrepreneurs are able to fully pay wages, but are







∗f (kτ+1,l τ+1) − wτ+1lτ+1) − rτ+1s
W
τ < 0
To prove the inequality it sufﬁc e st on o t et h a ti fqτ+1 would stay at the unity level, the stationary
steady state would persist, and hence dW
τ+1 would be zero. The fall in production causes deﬁcits
to change (dW falls from dW
τ =0to some dW
τ+1 < 0). Still, this does not change anything in the
equilibrium path, since the old workers do not participate in the clearing of the new credit market.
The only generation, which suffers from the shock, is the old generation. Young agents obtain the
endowment of b wτ+1 = wτ+1 = wτ, which allows them to clear credit and labor markets with the
same prices and allocations as in the stationary equilibrium before.




, differs from the above in that the initial change
12in deﬁcits is larger (since creditors receive nothing from entrepreneurs), and the wages to the
young generation cannot be paid in full. Instead, generation τ +1obtains the endowment of
b wτ+1 <w τ+1 = wτ. As a result, savings of the young generation, sW
τ+1, are smaller than those of
the previous generation sW
τ . This causes CM-line to shift upwards (for any new wage level, credit




































Figure 2. Changes in the market equilibrium
Since the clearing of the credit market does not involve old workers, the deﬁcit is not trans-















whichisvalidforanyn ∈ N. Sincetherearenonewshocks, theeconomyrecoverstothestationary
steady state, as soon as q∗ > 0. Otherwise, the economy collapses in the shock period. The
existence of the equilibrium is violated: qτ+1 =0implies b wτ+1 =0 , and hence sE
τ+1 = sW
τ+1 =0 ,
though the credit demand is strictly positive.
This can be summarized in the following result.
Proposition 2 Assume there exists a single stable stationary equilibrium in absence of shocks.
The evolution of the market economy in presence of a shock depends on the degree of the latter:
1. If qτ+1 ≥ q, then the market economy does not deviate from the steady state equilibrium path.
2. If qτ+1 <q , then the market economy recovers to the steady state.
13Proposition 2 shows that the concept of stability in a shockless economy may be extended
to the case of the economy exposed to shocks. Note that the burden of the shock is borne by the
old generation of the shock period. If the shock is severe, the whole old generation of the shock
period suffers from zero consumption, whereas the young generation of that period experiences
wage payoffs below those in the steady state.
It is important that the old generation cannot smoothen the burden of the shock through bor-
rowing from the young generation: the old generation cannot physically repay on such borrowings
in the next period, since it dies in the end of the current period. This incomplete participation
problem could be solved with help of a long-lived ﬁnancial intermediary.
4 Intermediated Economy
Financial intermediation is present in the economy through banks, which collect savings
from workers in the form of deposits, and offer credit to entrepreneurs. I assume the capital
of ﬁnancial intermediaries to be zero. It might be seen, e.g., as though ﬁnancial intermediaries
possess negligibly small capital and belong to old workers in each period t. The ownership is then
transferred from one generation to another through bequests and no market for banks’ stocks is
needed. The ownership could change budget constraints in (10) through dividend payments, but
due to the exogeneity of dividends for workers, the consumption-savings decision of the latter is
unchanged. The banking system is assumed to be homogeneous and is further considered as a
whole.
The sequence of events is the same as in the market economy, except for the credit market,
which is now splitted into two parts: the deposit market and the credit market per se.
T h ec o l l e c t i o no fd e p o s i t ss t a r t si np e r i o dt, when workers of generation t create their savings
sW
t . In the end of period t, entrepreneurs apply for credit to start their businesses. Payoffs of
entrepreneurs to banks take place within period t +1 . The value of deposits made with the banks
is equal to the value of aggregate savings of workers ηsW




It is assumed that no credit rationing takes place, and therefore no credit application is re-





. Within period t +1all entrepre-
neurs repay to banks the total of Bt+1 =( 1− η)bt+1,w i t hbt+1 deﬁned as above.
Since the decision-making repeats the one in the market economy, the savings functions and
the demand for production factors are the same. The only differences, which appear now, concern
the distinction between the credit and deposit markets. The savings function of entrepreneurs and
their demand for production factors in period t depend now on the credit interest rate rC
t+1.T h e
savings function of workers depends on the deposit interest rate rD
t+1.
If in period t+1the total payoff of entrepreneurs to banks does not cover total obligations of
banks before their depositors, banks experience a deﬁcit. Numerically, it is equal to the aggregate
deﬁcit of all workers in the market economy above.
Deﬁnition 3 Deﬁcit in the banking system in period t +1is





Banks are credible institutions and can use newly accumulated deposits to repay current
withdrawals.









t + dt (13)
Since banks operate in a competitive environment, neither deposit rates rD
t+1 nor credit rates
rC
t+1 differ among banks, therefore interest rates are taken as uniform in the market.
Proposition 3 C o m p e t i t i o ni nt h eb a nking system implies rD
t+1 = rC
t+1 = rt+1
The proof of the proposition follows from the fact that the expected proﬁt of banks is equal
to zero under competition in the banking system.
Now we can deﬁne a competitive equilibrium in the intermediated economy exposed to
shocks:
Deﬁnition 4 A (Markov) equilibrium in the shock-exposed intermediated economy in period t ≥
















, which provides that
6 Wagner (1857) based his "theory of banking sediment" (Bodensatztheorie) upon a similar idea.











The last condition is the competitive outcome for credit and deposit interest rates. The link
between the deposit and the credit market is given by the balance sheet equation of the banks
(condition 1 in deﬁnition 4).
Assoonasnewperiodt+1starts, theshockrealizationqt+1 determinesparameters{b wt+1,d t+1}
of the new equilibrium:
1. dt+1 =( 1− η)bt+1 − ηrt+1sW
t







,q t+1f (kt+1,l t+1) − et+1
¤
and et+1 =m i n[ wt+1lt+1,q t+1f (kt+1,l t+1)]






Note that changes in the deﬁcit level inﬂuence only the CM-line, and do not inﬂuence the
LM-line, although the resulting temporary equilibrium would differ for different values of dt.A n
increase in the absolute value of deﬁcits increases the equilibrium interest rate as deﬁn e db yt h e
credit market for any wage level wt+1 so that the CM-line shifts upwards in (wt+1,r t+1)-plane





The sign "<" in enequality (14) is due to the fact that dt ≤ 0, and increase in its absolute
value corresponds to the decrease in dt.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium interest rate and the equilibrium wage rate depend on the deﬁcit in the
banking sector: the equilibrium interest rate increases and the equilibrium wage level decreases









The intuition behind this lemma is obvious. According to (14) and due to the independence
16of the labor market equilibrium of the deﬁcit in the banking system, the equilibrium interest rate
and the wage level are determined by the movement of the equilibrium point along the LM-line.
Graphically, changes in the equilibrium in response to an increase in the absolute value of the
deﬁcit are the same as shown in Figure 2.
Proposition 4 If qt+1 =1for any t ≥ 1, then the intermediated economy replicates the market
economy.
This result ensures that if the market economy converges to the steady state, so does the
intermediated economy. The result is due to zero deﬁcits in the banking system, which leads to the
identity in the balance sheets of the market economy and of the intermediated one. It is important
that there is no risk in any form. This allows one to neglect the crucial difference between direct
debt contracts and indirect lending through deposit contracts: the debt contract presumes limited
liability of the issuer and the deposit contract presumes unlimited liability of the bank under the
assumption that the bank may ﬁnance deﬁcits through borrowing frm future generations.
Now assume again that in period τ the economy is in the steady state equilibrium, and the
shock parameter takes the value of q∗ < 1 in period τ +1 .
Proposition 5 The evolution of the intermediated economy depends on the degree of the shock:
1. If q∗ ∈ [q,1], then the economy converges to the steady state with d =0 .




, then under positive real interest rates the economy collapses in a ﬁnite number of
periods, otherwise it converges to the steady state with d =0(if real interest rates are negative)
or transfers deﬁcits to future periods (if real interest rates are zero).




, the banking system is bankrupt in the period of the shock.
The intuition behind proposition 5 is as follows. If q∗ ≥ q then old entrepreneurs repay
their debt in full and no deﬁcits in the banking system appear. According to proposition 4, the
intermediated economy replicates the market one, which converges to the steady state. If q∗ <
q, then necessarily dτ+1 < 0 since entrepreneurs default on their debts. Banks may exercise
their intertemporal smoothingr o l ea n dr e p a yt oo l dc r e d i t o r si nf o l l ,c o v e r i n gt h ed e ﬁcit through
17borrowing from the next generation of depositors. This augments deﬁcits with factor rτ+2,s i n c e
this is the interest rate to be paid on newly accumulated deposits. Due to the competition, the net
proﬁt of banks is zero and cannot reduce the deﬁcit. As a result, the deﬁcit follows the development
path: dt+1 = r∗
t+1dt, t>τ . This equation together with (15) and the assumption of positive real
interest rates
7, gives rise to a following diagrammaticinterpretation in a phase plane (see Fig. 3). In
a ﬁnite number of periods, the deﬁcit in the banking system cannot be covered anymore with newly
accumulated deposits, and therefore, the banking system is bankrupt: dτ+n ≤ dτ+n = −ηsW
τ+n.I f
q∗ <q , this happens immediately after the shock, since entrepreneurs fully default on their debts,
and underpay workers compared to the steady state. As a result, newly accumulated deposits













Figure 3. Evolution of the deﬁcit in the banking system
This result underlines the role of the competition in the banking sector. Indeed, if the com-
petition is not intense, banks are able to exploit positive proﬁt margin, which they could use to
cover the deﬁcit. Allen and Gale (1997) assume an intermediary to possess monopoly power,
which allows it to accumulate reserves. Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2006) consider a competitive
case and show that even if intermediaries enjoy positive interest rate margin, explained by a risk
7 A negative real interest rate, would have an effect of a subsidy provided by future generations, and would shrink the
deﬁcits. If workers might choose between depositing with the bank and investing in a durable good,
negative real interest rate would be impossible. This would require changes in the utility maximization
problems in the beginning of the paper.
18premium, banking system still may collapse, since the competition will shrink the margin. The
model above shows that the development path of the intermediated economy differs from that of
the market economy only if the shock is strong enough to create the deﬁcit. The following section
analyzes regulatory measures, which may improve the performance of the intermediated economy.
5R e g u l a t i o n
Above, it was impliciltly assumed that the regulator follows a policy of forbearance with
regards to insolvency resolutions: remember, banks with deﬁcits are technically insolvent. Along
with that, banks were assumed to be credible institutions. This assumption may require some
regulatory guarantees, which prevent bank runs. The crisis, which appears in the model above (the
deteriorationofbalancesheetsofbanks), isdistinctfrombankingpanics, andregulatoryguarantees
or deposit insurance need to be complemented with other regulatory measures.
5.1 Liquidity assistance with no enforcement
Assume that the regulator possesses a stock M of liquid funds, which can only be accessed by
banks experiencing deﬁcits and is not otherwise used. For simplicity, M m a yb es e e na na s s i s -
tance from abroad (e.g. from an International Lender of Last Resort), or as a stabilization fund
accumulated during the periods, when the economy was in its steady state. The analysis here con-
centrates on the impact of liquidity injections. The question of their optimal ﬁnancing is out of
consideration.
If dt < 0, banks may apply for a one-period loan from the regulator charged with the gross
interest rate of rM. This is a general formulation: rM =0corresponds to the case of a subsidy;
any rate of rM < 1 corresponds to a subsidized loan. The total amount of loans granted by the
regulator in period t has to cover the deﬁcit in the banking sector and is therefore
Mt = −dt (16)
The credit is granted by the regulator in the end of period t, covers the deﬁcit accrued in
period t,l a s t sf o ro n ep e r i o da n di sr e p a i dt ot h er e g u l a t o ri nt h ee n do fp e r i o dt +1in the total
amount of rMMt.









t + dt + Mt (17)
To complete the description, I assume that the interest (if any) gained on such liquidity
injections is used to increase the stock M. I leave therefore all possible ﬁscal distortions (taxes
and income redistribution) aside and focus only on the bailout effect of such intervention.
Assume again the system is in its steady state in period τ,a n dt h es h o c kqτ+1 = q∗ makes
entrepreneurs to default in period τ +1 . The banking system experiences a deﬁcit dτ+1 < 0 in










Effectively, the deﬁcit is vanished from the banking system, and proposition 4 would ensure
that the intermediated economy follows the same recovery path as the market economy, if deﬁcits
do not re-appear in the banking sector. Further evolution of deﬁcits is given by














If the regulator does not possess enforcement mechanisms, banks are not forced to repay the
loan within period τ +2 .
8 The expected proﬁt of banks for period τ +2is then













The expected proﬁt is equal to zero due to the competition in the banking sector. Together




T h ec a s eo fap u r es u b s i d y( rM =0 )e l i m i n a t e sd e ﬁcits, and the economy returns to the
steady state. The case of subsidized loans (rM < 1) shrinks deﬁcit to zero. If liquidity injections
are charged with an interest rate rM > 1, but are not restrictive enough to change the proﬁte x p e c -
tations of banks, deﬁcits in the banking sector deteriorate further. The unrestricted continuation
of such policy repeats the above described steps, and, as in the case of unregulated dynamics, the
collapse is unavoidable: the banking system is bankrupt in a ﬁnite number of periods. The stock
8 Especially, itmaybetrue, whenbankersexpecttheregulatortoprovidethebankingsystemwithliquidityassistance
during systemic crises. Unrestricted access to such liquidity source distorts proﬁt expectations of bankers.
20of liquid funds M can not be exhausted, since starting from the period τ +2deﬁcits in the bank-
ing system are constituted only of the debt before the regulator, so that "liquidity" injections do
not actually require any transfer of liquid funds, but rather take a form of "virtual" credits, which
only result in an accumulation of unpaid interest. Setting rM =1allows the postponement of the
collapse without any accumulation of debts.
The discussion above leads to the following conclusion. Liquidity injections with no en-
forcement either postpone the collapse (if the assistance is provided through interest-free loans) or
prevent the collapse (if banks are subsidized). In both cases the burden of the shock is borne by the
regulator. If the loan from the regulator is charged with a positive real interest, the banking system
is bankrupt in a ﬁnite number of periods.
5.2 Liquidity Injections with enforcements
It is possible that the regulator uses enforcements, penalties or a direct control to affect proﬁte x -
pectations of the banks. In such a case, banks do count for the repayment of debts to the regulator:














Zero expected proﬁt (due to the competition) implies that banks set the deposit interest rate
below the credit interest rate (which is ﬁx e db yc o n d i t i o n1 8 )a ss o o na srM > 1. The new level of
deﬁcits in the banking system is then dτ+2 =0 . At the same time, the amount of deposits in the
banking sector decreases due to a decrease in the deposit interest rate (hence, sW
τ+1 <s W
τ )a n dt h e
credit market is cleared under a higher credit interest rate. The new equilibrium results in lower
wages and higher credit interest rate (see Fig. 2).
In period τ +2there are no deﬁcits in the economy, and the proﬁt expectations of banks are













Therefore, banks set deposit and credit interest rates equal to each other: rC
τ+3 = rD
τ+3.
According to Proposition 4, the intermediated economy replicates the market one and recovers to
the steady state
To summarize, short-term loans with enforcement mechanisms allow for a recovery of the
system after a middle-sized production shock. The burden of the shock is borne by the population
21in the periods next to the shock: depositors receive deposit interest below the credit interest rate,
and at the same time they obtain smaller wages due to a fall in production, which also leads to a
lower consumption level of entrepreneurs.
Note that the case of liquidity injections almost completely corresponds to the case of banks
borrowing from future generations. The two very principal differences are: (1) in the case of
liquidity injections, the interest rate rM is not the equilibrium outcome but rather is set by the
regulator, and (2) the regulator possesses some power over banks and may make banks internalize
the costs of such a bailout.
5.3 Deposit Rate Ceiling
The regulator introduces the deposit rate ceiling rD ≤ rDreg, which distorts the equality between
deposit and credit interest rates in a following way:
r
D








If rDreg >r C




t+1 so that the regulated dynamics repeats the case of the unregulated one. After the shock, the
credit interest rate increases, as shown for the case of the unregulated dynamics, and at some point
τ the condition rDreg <r C
τ+1 holds, which ﬁxes the deposit rate
9.
With regards to the equilibrium deﬁnition, condition (21) replaces condition 3 in Deﬁnition
4. The equilibrium condition for the labor market is not disturbed by the introduction of the
regulation since it depends only on the credit interest rate. If the deposit rate is ﬁx e db yt h ec e i l i n g ,
























∂rDreg < 0. This is explained by the fact that a decrease in the deposit rate, which is now
exogenously ﬁxed by the regulation, leads to less deposits with banks. Therefore, the credit supply
decreases, and the credit interest rate increases in order to hold the equilibrium. In other words,
setting the regulated deposit rate at the level below that of the unregulated equilibrium, increases





22credit interest rate and hence makes the banks’ proﬁt margin positive.
Assume that rD
τ+n = rDreg (if rDreg is relatively high, it may require some n periods, n ∈ N,
for condition 25 to be binding). Further dynamics of banking deﬁcits is given by








































Note that if dτ+n = −ηsW
τ+n, the banking system is bankrupt and the equilibrium rate rC
τ+n+1
does not exist. Otherwise, there always exists such rDreg that provides a recovery of the banking




. For example, rDreg =1would always provide
a recovery since either (25) is met, or rC
τ+n+1 < 1, which guarantees the recovery as shown in
proposition 5. If the regulator delays with the intervention, the deﬁcit augments in time, therefore
a prompt intervention is desirable.
T h em a i nf e a t u r eo ft h ed e p o s i tr a t ec e i l i n gi st h ec r e a t i o no fap o s i t i v ep r o ﬁtm a r g i nf o r
the banks, which would allow them to cover deﬁcits. Both the enforcement mechanisms and
the deposit rate ceiling distort the competitive outcome in the banking sector with regard to the
relationship between the credit interest rate and the deposit interest rate.
6 Welfare Considerations
To proceed with a welfare comparison of the two economies, I assume that there exists a
proper regulation scheme, which allows intermediated economy to recover after the shock.
The market economy does not generate subsequent events after a small or a middle-sized
shock. In the case of a severe production shock, there are subsequent events, which are generated
by the shock and transferred in the market economy to the after-shock periods. Obviously, the
scale of these subsequent events is not greater than the scale of the same events in the interme-
diated economy (since deﬁcits, which are generated in the banking system, create an additional
23obstacle for the system to recover). Therefore one can expect that the market economy, which
demonstrates higher speed of recovery, would overperform the intermediated economy in sense of
smaller consumption losses for the generations after the shock. The question is hence, whether the
market economy performs better or worse than the intermediated one in the period of the shock
impact? The social losses for the generations, who live in this period, are in the intermediated
economy smaller or equal to those in the market economy. In terms of an intertemporal social
welfare function, there always exists such a function which would attribute smaller intertemporal
social losses to an intermediated economy (it sufﬁces to count for the losses of future generations
with a high enough discount factor). At the same time there would always exist social welfare
functions, which would attribute better performance (in sense of intergenerational reduction of
social losses) to the market economy.
Proposition 6 If the shock is small, intermediated economy provides agents of each generation
with the same utility as the market economy does. In case of a middle-sized and severe shock, the
judgment upon the optimality of the ﬁnancial system depends on the choice of the intergenerational
social welfare function. If the shock is extreme, neither of the ﬁnancial systems can prevent the
collapse of the economy.
It is not a trivial task to judge upon which system provides better arrangements against
macroeconomic shocks. The judgment would crucially depend on the choice of the social wel-
fare function. Still, as Bolton (2002) notes, the question of which type of ﬁnancial system should
be adopted, is of a great relevance for transitory and developing countries. One may expect that for
a country in poverty and with high vulnerability to shocks it may be desirable to provide arrange-
ments, which would rather guarantee a smoothing of the shock impact over several generations
than a high speed of recovery with high burden on one generation. In this sense, the current paper
suggests that a properly regulated banking system may provide such arrangements.
It should be noted that the after-shock generations do not experience a decrease in consump-
tion compared to their consumption plans; their planned consumption is always achieved in equi-
librium. The reduction in consumption is revealed only through a comparison with a benchmark
case, which is a steady state level.
247C o n c l u s i o n s
Amarket-basedﬁnancialsystemmayprovidearecoveryoftheeconomyafteranon-permanent
negativeproductionshock, iftheshockisnotextreme. Anunregulatedbank-basedﬁnancialsystem
replicates the market economy if the shock is small. A middle-sized shock leads to a collapse of the
unregulated bank-based economy within a ﬁnite number of periods. This difference arises through
the fact that the banking system transfers the shock into the future through its balance-sheet chan-
nel, in addition to a market channel. The balance-sheet channel allows banks experiencing deﬁcits,
to borrow from future generations of depositors in order to repay to the current depositors in full.
Under competition, banks suffer from a zero proﬁt margin and are unable to cover the deﬁcit.
A regulatory measure should create conditions for a positive proﬁt margin for banks. Unre-
stricted liquidity injections may not be usefull in preventing the collapse unless they take a form of
a subsidy. A liquidity assistance may lead to the recovery if the regulator can introduce enforce-
ment mechanisms. Another type of a regulatory intervention is an introduction of a proper deposit
rate ceiling. In an economy with a properly regulated banking system the recovery is in general
slower than in the market economy.
However, the market economy concentrates the burden of the shock in one period. In con-
trast, bank-based ﬁnancial systems smoothen the shock, so that the burden of the shock for the
generations in the period of the shock impact is reduced. At the same time, subsequent gen-
erations suffer from a reduced consumption due to lower wages and higher interest rates in the
intermediated economy. The choice between the two types of ﬁnancial systems depends on social
preferences. Economies in poverty may prefer avoiding the concentration of the shock burden
on one generation, and therefore establishing a sound banking system may be more desirable for
them, than a market based ﬁnancial system.
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27Appendix A. Degrees of Shock
The shock in the model is determined by the shock parameter q∗ ∈ [0;1], and is measured by
the output after the shock as a percentage of the output in steady state. This does not, however,
mean that the shock of q∗, which is middle-sized or severe in one economy, would be necessarily
middle-sized or severe in another economy. To discuss this issue, assume that the shock q∗ occurs
in the steady state. The severity of the shock depends on the steady state price system, namely on
the wage and interest rate level.

















with the "barred" variables referring to the steady state.
As it can be seen, an economy with a higher share of capital in production has necessarily a
smaller q, and hence is less vulnerable with respect to a shock: the probability that a shock of q∗
is middle-sized, but not severe, is in highly capitalized economies higher than in less capitalized
economies. Indeed, the ratio
f(k,l)





as the capitalization of production increases. In the stationary point, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms set




. Hence, equation (A-2)















which determines the area of severe shocks. On the other hand, higher capitalization leads to a
higher marginal product of labor, so that the general effect may be ambiguous and depends on the
substitutability between labor and capital.
10
10 For a Cobb-Douglas production function f = kαlβ (α + β ≤ 1) one obtains APL =
f
l = kαlβ−1 and
MPL = βkαlβ−1,s ot h a tq = β<1. If capital and labor are perfect substitutes (f = αk + βl),
MPL= β,a n dq = 1
αk/l+β, which decreases as capitalization increases.
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Figure 4. Degrees of Shock









so that the term
(1+r)(k−sE)




of the middle-sized shock.
Note that sE is the internal ﬁnance provided by entrepreneurs themselves, and k − sE is external
borrowing. The higher the share of internal capital, the higher the probability of the shock being
small.V icev ersa,thehighertheshareofthee xternalcapital,themorevulnerableistheeconomyto
the productionshock. The above reasoningalsoapplies tothe average productivityof the borrowed
capital APKB =
f(k,l)
k−sE and to the marginal productivity of capital MPK =1+r:









One may expect that in economies with high capitalization and low costs of capital (due to
decreasing marginal productivity, high capitalization implies low MPK and therefore low equi-
librium borrowing costs), the difference q − q shrinks.
If one assumes that both q and q − q are decreasing functions of k, the following schematic
29representation is possible (see Fig. 4).
11 In the ﬁgure, it is shown that a shock q∗ may be seen
as a middle-sized shock for a smaller economy, whereas it is a small shock for a large (highly
capitalized) economy. Moreover, it is also possible that a shock q∗∗, which is small for a highly
developed economy, is severe for a less developed economy.
12 For example, a loss of 10% GDP
(the shock parameter q∗ =0 .9) may represent a small shock for an economy developed economy,
but be a middle-sized (or even severe) shock for an underdeveloped labor-intense economy with
low average productivity of labor. This discussion suggests that the results of the current paper
may be of different signiﬁcance for developed and underdeveloped economies.
Countries with more labor-intensive production seem to be more vulnerable to stronger
shocks, whereas developed countries seem to be less vulnerable to the degrees of the shock, which
may demonstrate the difference between the market-based and bank-based ﬁnancial systems. This
qualitative remark may be another fact in favor of establishing bank-oriented ﬁnancial systems in
emerging economies, due to their smaller capitalization and poorer technological development.
On the contrary, in developed economies the probability of middle-sized shocks is lower, and the
advantages of the banking system in intertemporal smoothing of exogenous negative shocks may
be less noticeable.
11 The purpose of the diagram is only to illustrate the possibility of different treatment of the same
shock by different economies. A detailed analysis of the shock-response functions is not the focus of this paper.
12 Here, the development is understood in sense of the marginal product - average product ratios introduced above.
I do not focus on this issue further, since the degree of the development is not the principal issue in
theanalysis here. Still, it isimportanttonotethattherelevanceof theanalysismay be differentfordifferenteconomies.
30Appendix B. Proofs
PROOF of Proposition 1
Proof.
Existence
Preferences and production technology satisfy the assumptions of the competitive equilib-
rium existence theorem (Arrow and Debreu, 1954), which ensures the existence of the equilib-
rium:
13
1. the set of available consumption vectors (ct,c t+1) for each generation t is closed and bounded
from below
2. the preferences of consumers of each generationt are represented by continuous, monotonically
increasing, quasi-concave utility functions of (ct,c t+1)
3. the initial endowment of the individuals is strictly positive at least in one component (in the
model, each individual in each generation is endowed with one unit of labor, which is converted
into b wt > 0 units of initial endowment in goods)
4. production technologies belong to a part of each generation and are given by a continuous
strictly increasing and concave production functions with no output at zero input.
Uniqueness





Function l(rt+1,w t+1) decreases in both interest rate and wage level ( ∂l
∂rt+1 < 0, ∂l
∂wt+1 < 0).
The implicit function theorem guarantees that equation (B-1) deﬁnes a unique function rt+1 (wt+1)
with
∂rt+1
∂wt+1 < 0. This means that for any given interest rate established in the credit market, there
will always exist only one equilibrium wage level in the labor market.
13 Arrow and Debreu (1954) consider multiproduct technologies with an assumption that in the absence of
factor restrictions, the production of any good may be increased without a decrease in the production
of other goods. The model in the current paper is based upon a one-product technology.










Optimal choice of the entrepreneurs implies ∂k








Optimal choice of the workers implies
∂sW
t
∂wt+1 < 0 and
∂sW
t
∂rt+1 > 0. The sum and the difference of
differentiable functions are differentiable. Hence, equation (B-2) also implicitly yields a differen-
tiable function rt+1 (wt+1) which is unique.
Combining rCM
t+1 (wt+1),d e ﬁned in the credit market, with rLM
t+1 (wt+1),d e ﬁn e di nt h el a b o r
market, we obtain an equilibrium interest rate and wage level, which exist. Assume that there are
several equilibria and choose the one with the smallest wt+1 = w. Consider now the difference
rCM
t+1 (wt+1) − rLM
t+1 (wt+1), which is zero in the equilibrium chosen. This difference increases as









Hence, the difference rCM
t+1 (wt+1) − rLM
t+1 (wt+1) is positive for any wt+1 >w . This means
there are no equilibria with wt+1 >w . Because of the choice of w, there are also no equilibria with
wt+1 <w , This proves the uniqueness of the equilibrium point (w∗





Lemma 2 Equilibrium gap rCM
t+1 (wt+1) − rLM
t+1 (wt+1) increases in wt+1



























The denominator in this fraction is always positive. Since (B-4) is valid for any value of































This means that for all possible functions k, sE and sW,s e t t i n gη =0(and close to it)
guarantees that CM-line is monotonically decreasing in wt+1; and setting η =1(and close to it)
guarantees that CM-line is monotonically increasing in wt+1 for any given wage parameter wt.
Furthermore, for each set of functions k, sE and sW, the slope of the CM-line monotonically




























´i2 > 0 (B-7)
This ensures that at any point wt+1 the derivative
∂rt+1
∂wt+1 is always bounded by (B-5) from











(for proof see Lemma 3 below),
the slope of the LM-line is smaller than the smallest possible slope of the CM-line in any point
wt+1,s ot h a tt h eg a prCM
t+1 − rLM
t+1 increases in wt+1.
14



















































14 It sufﬁces to consider the derivative of this gap.










where kw,l w,s E
w,k r,l r, and sE
r denote derivatives of the respective functions.
This last condition is fulﬁl l e da ss o o na s
lwkr − lws
E
r >k wlr − s
E
wlr (B-12)





2 < 0 (B-13)
kw = lr =
−fkl
fkkfll − (fkl)




2 < 0 (B-15)
Hence





2¤2 < 0 (B-16)
Combining this with sE
w < 0 and sE
r > 0, we obtain
−lws
E
r >k wlr − lwkr − s
E
wlr (B-17)
The latter inequality is true, since the left-hand side is positive and the right-hand side is
negative. This proves B-12 and consequently the statement of the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof.
Assume that the economy in period τ is in the steady state equilibrium, and in period τ +1
the shock parameter takes the value of qτ+1 = q∗. First, consider the shock impact.
1. Small shock. In both systems only one group of agents suffers from the shock: namely,
the entrepreneurs of generation τ suffer from lower consumption when old.
15 The denominator fkkfll − (fkl)













Consumption of the entrepreneurs cE
τ+1 is cE











τ+1 =( 1− η)
¡
(1 − q














Both the market economy and the intermediated one return to the steady state, and there is
no welfare difference between the two intertemorally.
2. Middle-sized shock. In the market economy, entrepreneurs of generation τ are bankrupts,
a n dt h e i rc o n s u m p t i o ni np e r i o dτ +1is zero, so that their losses equal to the total planned con-





− wτ+1lτ+1. Creditors (old workers) of generation τ





− q∗f (kτ+1,l τ+1). Young genera-




τ+1 =( 1 − η)
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In the intermediated economy, entrepreneurs of generation τ are bankrupts and their con-
sumption is zero. Banks experience deﬁcits, but manage to repay all debts to depositors, so that no
losses on the side of depositors occur. Social losses in period τ +1are
∆
I
τ+1 =( 1− η)
¡








There are indirect losses associated with the increase in credit interest rate and decrease both in
deposit interest rate and wage level, so that few next generations can not enjoy from consumption
at the steady state level. But no other direct social losses occur in the shock period. With due
regulation economy recovers to the stationary state.

















3. Severe shock. In the market economy, entrepreneurs of generation τ are bankrupts with
zero consumption. Creditors (old workers) of generation τ receive zero loan repayments and their
individual losses amount to rτ+1sW
τ . The young generation receives reduced wage repayments and
their losses are wτ+1lτ+1 − q∗f (kτ+1,l τ+1). Total social losses are in this case
∆
M
τ+1 =( 1 − η)
¡











τ + wτ+1lτ+1 − q
∗f (kτ+1,l τ+1)
In the intermediated economy, entrepreneurs of generation τ are bankrupts, and the young















with τ denoting the period of the shock, ξτ+n - a weight coefﬁcient, and ∆I
τ+n social losses of
period τ + n computed as the difference between the social welfare in the steady state and the
actual social welfare.
If we choose ξτ =1and ξτ+n =0for all n>1, we obtain the case of no intergenerational
altruism, which would attribute better performance to the intermediated economy, since it outper-
forms the market economy in the period of the shock. If we choose ξτ+n =0for all 1 <n≤ m,
and ξτ+n =1for all n ≥ m+1, we obtain the case of an extreme intergenerational altruism, where
the generation τ cares only about the welfare of their ancestors of degrees m and higher. In this
case it wouldbe possible toﬁnd suchmthat the social losses function attributes better performance
to the market economy, since the market economy possesses a higher speed of convergence to the
steady state.
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